Category

Geopolitics

AUKUS and the return of geopolitics

Written by Alexander van Wijnen
October 18, 2021

In his seminal 1990 paper From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics, Edward Luttwak described a global shift triggered by the end of the Cold War: international relations would no longer be dictated by instruments of military power, but by instruments of economic power. We have written before about several of such geo-economic phenomena, such as technical standards, German power and the G7 tax deal.

However, in recent years, geopolitics seems to be making a comeback. Examples include Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 as well as territorial disputes in East Asia. Most recently, AUKUS, the military agreement between the U.S., UK and Australia, has shown that the U.S., still the undisputed global hegemon, is returning to geopolitical instruments of power. Indeed, a shift back from geo-economics to geopolitics fits the return of hegemonic conflict, a process that will take decades. In the coming years, the return of geopolitics will be felt increasingly in sensitive areas like East Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.

Burning questions:

  • How will geopolitics and geo-economics co-exist in the coming years?
  • What are some extreme scenarios in the intensifying conflicts of geo-economics, in particular in the conflict between the U.S. and China?

How a decline in trust can be a driver for new political leadership

Written by Vivian Elion
October 18, 2021

The latest Edelman Trust barometer shows that global trust in governments has declined, from 61% in May 2020 to 56% in January 2021. These findings suggest that the trust bubble that was built up during the coronavirus crisis has burst. A similar dynamic is visible in the Netherlands: research institute Ipsos found that six out of ten respondents have no trust in the government, up from four out of ten last year. The reasons for this decline in trust include health policy, the housing market and the struggle to form a new government.

Especially the last issue weighs heavily. Six out of ten respondents have lost faith in the demissionary cabinet, even though it looks like this exact cabinet will continue as Rutte IV in the coming four years. An NRC article rightfully points out: how can we expect the same people who caused the problem in the first place, to fix issues like the social benefits scandal in the future? Results of the Ipsos report hint at a possible answer to this question. Pieter Omtzigt, the former CDA politician who fought for justice for and transparency towards the victims, received the highest appreciation score from the respondents. It might be time for Rutte IV to step away from its pragmatic, utilitarian style of leadership and develop more of an ideals-based government with an explicit mission to take on challenges such as the lack of governmental transparency and societal inequality.

Burning questions:

  • Why did voters re-elect the same parties if trust in exactly these parties has decreased?
  • Who are the main agents of change in an ecosystem of declining trust: politics, civil society, business or citizens?
  • Will polarization and a decline in trust drive further radicalization of both the far left and right? If so, how?

The ‘Wechselstimmung’ after Merkel

Written by Sebastiaan Crul
September 30, 2021

Merkel’s main task was to hold things together and safeguard the nation’s prosperity. Looking back, she passed with flying colors. Merkel provided guidance and steered Germany through the financial crisis, the Eurozone crisis, the European migrant crisis and the COVID-19 crisis. The mother of the nation brought stability in turbulent times with her conservative moderate-right politics. Internationally, her calmness and rationality were the perfect antidote to the hysteria of emotional and short-tempered leaders such as Orbán and Bolsonaro.

Opponents point to the fact that Europe bouncing from crisis to crisis was also the perfect cover for Merkel’s lack of vision. When Trump entered the office, she somewhat shook off this image and naturally became the leader and face of liberal values. And with her stance in the refugee crisis, she won the hearts and minds of many worldwide. While outsiders mostly applauded this new face of Merkel, some Germans responded with disappointment or even felt abandoned. According to psychologist Stephan Grünewald, who is well-known for measuring the “Stimmung” of the country, confidence in Merkel has been showing cracks in the past years. After sixteen years of Merkel, the zeitgeist of the nation is now more ambivalent than it was at the beginning of the century. While the big challenges ahead have made many realize more structural change and progressive politics are needed (‘Wechselstimmung’), the perceived rising insecurity of a broad part of the population and the aftermath of a pandemic aren’t contributing. For many, change is exactly what is feared the most. Thus, even without Merkel, ‘Merkelism’ is likely to survive in German politics for some time.

Burning questions:

  • Will Merkel’s successor build on her image of “defender of the free world” or focus more on domestic policy?
  • With Scholz being a relatively conservative and technocratic politician, can we interpret his win as a sign that Germans are indeed afraid of change?

The future of the anti-establishment, conservative right

Written by Pim Korsten
September 20, 2021

Last week, many high-profile supporters of Trump voiced their support for incumbent president Jair Bolsonaro at the world’s biggest conservative, anti-establishment right political event. Bolsonaro is preparing for re-election next year, but his ratings and support have been falling to all-time lows. In other countries, the far right seems to have been losing ground as well recently, such as in France and the UK, or stalling, as in Germany. With many important elections in major economies next year, like Germany, France, U.S. (mid-term elections), Brazil, India, Sweden, Australia, next year could become a crucial year for the far right.

Reasons for this might be the mishandling of far-right governments of the coronavirus crisis, as in Brazil, Russia and the U.S. A second reason could be the resurgence of the Big Left and Big Government in the wake of the pandemic, fueled by calls of the general public for more government intervention (e.g. on inequality) and government spending. Lastly, there could be a general shift in consensus on what the core issue is; from identity politics and culture wars to fighting climate change and creating more resilient societies in a sustainable sense.

Burning questions:

  • Unlike in Western European countries, support for the far right is rising in Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal. Could we see a resurgence of the far right in these countries that were unaffected by the recent far-right wave that started in 2015?
  • Can far-right parties build momentum in the run-up to next year’s elections, as they have often done by proving polls wrong (e.g. remember Trump’s election odds?)
  • In what sense has the far-right agenda been taken over by “mainstream parties”, e.g. has the center become more right-wing and has identity politics become more for the middle parties?

China’s CBDC-as-a-standard?

Written by Alexander van Wijnen
September 20, 2021

An August 2021 report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) shows that China is far ahead of other countries in the development of a “central bank digital currency” (CBDC). Whereas most countries are still researching the possibility of a CBDC, China has been running different types of pilots since 2019. In effect, a CBDC, by eliminating the role of intermediary entities in the financial system, allows for more efficient financial transactions. Based on such efficiency, it is expected that China’s CBDC will boost the share of the yuan in the global financial system. Yet, turning the yuan into the global reserve currency is not China’s primary goal here.

Instead, China primarily seeks to protect its companies against American sanctions by building a financial infrastructure that parallels the US dollar system. The report highlights several reasons as to why China’s CBDC is likely to become a standard. China’s pilots are far ahead of other countries and its government is willing to boost adoption aggressively (e.g. discounts for consumers, incentives for trade). Also, China has already set standards for a new global financial infrastructure through “m-CBDC” (a cross-border payment project between China, Hong Kong, Thailand and the UAE), the Blockchain Service Network, and the inter-bank payment system of CIPS. Finally, China already has large international payment platforms which are accessible through government intervention (UnionPay, Alipay, WeChat Pay).

Burning questions:

  • What are the consequences of a Chinese parallel (to the U.S. dollar) financial system for trade and capital flows?
  • To what extent will the CBDC be able to boost the dominance of Chinese firms in other regions (e.g. Southeast Asia)?

Climate litigation and civil society

Written by Sebastiaan Crul
September 3, 2021

Over the past years, there has been a “rights turn” in climate litigation. Previously, most cases focused primarily on the violation of specific laws, when the court has to decide, for example, if a company is responsible for environmental damage in a specific region. Currently, a growing percentage of climate litigation employs right claims in lawsuits, with the Urgenda case as both a landmark case and turning point in climate litigation. Climate litigation has become climate change litigation. Governments worldwide are now being sued over global warming and their insufficient action to protect citizens.

In the wake of the IPCC report, climate litigation bears some clear advantages over traditional consensus-based legislation in democracies for citizens to speed up climate action. In addition, even if climate cases have an unfavorable outcome, there may be positive indirect effects such as lower stock prices of grey companies and growing public awareness. This “strategic” litigation is on the rise and could be a core feature of planetary citizenship in the next decade, favored over mass demonstration (e.g. “the case of the century” was signed by 2.3 million French citizens). However, because climate litigation cases entail human rights, defensive counter-cases are also a growing phenomenon, as this report shows. This “anti climate litigation” is a logical consequence of the polarized debate and could undermine climate action. If climate laws harm some people more than others, such as farmers or construction workers, then climate litigation could lead to an arms race of cases and put heavy pressure on the already struggling Western parliaments. Sidelining the parliamentary democracy is never without risks.

Burning questions:

  • What are the positive indirect effects of climate litigation?
  • How can parliamentary democracies prevent their being flooded with climate litigation cases in the future?
  • Is it time to grant basic rights to glaciers and other natural phenomena that are under existential threat?

The G7 tax deal is all about American geo-economics

Written by Alexander van Wijnen
June 16, 2021

The G7 reached a historic agreement for a global corporate tax rate of a minimum of 15% in which corporations must also pay taxes in nations where they sell (and not just where they’re headquartered). If we take the deal at face value, it seems that power is shifting from corporations to states. After all, since the 1980s, the global corporate tax rate had been dropping from 50% to 24%, as developing countries built growth models by attracting foreign investors with lower taxes and some developed countries also took part in the ‘race to the bottom’ (e.g. Ireland, the Netherlands, Singapore).

However, behind the deal of the G7, more forces are at play. Although it is a multilateral deal, hailed by many as the return of responsible U.S. leadership, it is primarily the U.S. that will benefit. First, it is expected that the biggest share of taxes will be paid by U.S. big tech companies to the U.S. itself. Second, in exchange for its concessions in the deal, the U.S. has demanded the removal of the Digital Services Taxes of European countries. It shows that American multilateralism is still a ‘geo-economic’ instrument to wield power across the globe.

Burning questions:

  • How will the EU adjust to U.S. demands to drop digital services taxes?
  • Will there be a G20 tax deal in July?

Lifestyle politics in the planetary age

Written by Sebastiaan Crul
June 3, 2021

Lifestyle politics refers to the politicization of everyday life choices and is closely tied to our self-actualization in late modernity. This form of political participation has become a strong political weapon in these times of complexity, uncertainty and pressing global issues. In late modernity, various new forms of extra-parliamentary politics are arising to mitigate the (perceived) weakening of state-oriented politics.

On the one hand, lifestyle politics fit the ideal of subsidiarity in our planetary age. To battle planetary challenges such as rising sea levels and pandemics effectively, we have to delegate governance to the lowest level possible. The individual becomes the first “governing institution” of the globalized world. At the same time, if everyday life choices become so central to politics, this dependence on lifestyle could further alleviate the polarization and fragmentation of societies within nation-states. Furthermore, contrary to the expectations of some advocates of lifestyle politics, the pandemic has made us realize that state-oriented politics is anything but obsolete. The inward orientation of lifestyle politics combined with strong nation-states might lead to what the philosopher Tocqueville calls “soft despotism”, meaning that the will and freedom of man are “not shattered but softened, bent and guided”. Individuals are not oppressed, but are subject to the tutelary power of expanding national bureaucratic states and institutions.

Burning questions:

  • How do we align global lifestyle politics with the representative institutions of the political systems of nation-states?
  • Is the tutelary power of the bureaucratic welfare state a serious threat to our post-coronavirus world?
  • How do we prevent lifestyle politics from degenerating into trivial forms of lifestyle consumerism?

The European Deep Transition Strategy

Written by Sebastiaan Crul
April 2, 2021

A lot has been written about the unfolding European Digital Strategy to reclaim the digital sphere from private interests and make it more equitable and fair. However, the EU is also becoming a regulatory superpower in the non-digital realm. This month, for example, the European Parliament paved the way for new European legislation that stresses corporate accountability and due diligence for human rights within value chains.

Furthermore, the ECB aspires to become a pioneer in fighting climate change, by slashing bond purchases by heavy carbon emitters and advancing “green bonds” and integrating climate risk in its stress tests for the banking sector. And last year, the EU adopted new “eco-design measures” that should make it easier to repair – rather than replace – old household appliances, such as washing machines, dishwashers and refrigerators. All these measures are meant to create more equitable and sustainable consumer practices, production processes, and value chains in the real economy. As such, the EU is leveraging the “Brussels Effect” to begin to establish the meta-rules of the Second Deep Transition.

Burning questions:

  • Will other countries follow Europe’s example or will this legislation cause more geopolitical friction?
  • Does the EU have the coherence and unity to push and enforce all legislation?
  • What is the goal or set of meta-rules that the EU has in mind?

The Retroscope 2020

Written by Freedomlab Thinktank

2020 was a year in which society and the economy were hit hard. At the same time, it was also an interesting year in which many issues that had already arisen in the previous years were brought into much sharper focus. Last summer, we explored all of these issues in our scenario study “The Resilient World”, in which we reflected on the different worlds that could emerge from this crisis. In this Retroscope, we look back on the past year and consider the current state of affairs regarding the most significant uncertainties we formulated in our study.

Technological cycle 

The corona crisis has profoundly affected the technoscientific self-confidence of modern societies. First and foremost, the crisis has taught us that our modern technology is still not able to tame nature to the full. Yet, it may also open our eyes to the fact that we have failed to make the best of our technological capabilities. So, could the coronavirus crisis indeed lead toa different perspective on technology? Will it trigger us to solve our structural problems and thus prevent another crisis?

The tech-fix illusion is nearing its end

Overnight, the world came to a standstill because of a virus, as our technological solutions only worked to a moderate extent in combating the pandemic. The strongly intertwined global network society is even identified as one of the most important causes of the rapid spread of the virus. In addition, even before the pandemic, large technology companies were under immense societal pressure, which does not appear to have abated. Many believe they are partly responsible for societal unrest, caused in part by floods of disinformation, and polarization. After another excellent year on the stock market, their innovation is perceived to mainly benefit shareholders.

The partial loss of confidence in technology and its makers does not contribute to the development of possible forms of technological prevention. For example, in the past year, we’ve seen how prevention often coincides with different forms of surveillance. Especially in the West, citizens tend to be wary of the use of technology because of an expanding and monitoring government. Especially the collection of data by governments or private companies worries citizens. Although we acknowledge the potential advantages of a data-driven economy, when it comes down to it, we are reluctant, as has also become clear with the coronavirus app. Despite high expectations and long ethical deliberations, too few citizens have turned out to be willing to install the app. In addition, due to ethical concerns, the app has been modified to such an extent that its potential contribution to containing the pandemic has become minimal.

In the public debate of the past year, technocratic ideals and civil liberties were posited as opposites, difficult to unite. This is not wholly surprising in a year when we were mainly told not to do certain things. The tension we all experienced in the first lockdown, consisting mainly of fear and a certain degree of excitement, has given way to the fragmented fatigue and frustration of the second, current lockdown. While technology (partly) enables us tocontinue working, shopping and enjoying ourselves, we are now harshly confronted with the limitations of the current technological solutions. As the crisis unfolded, the emphasis in speeches began to shift increasingly to human behavior. Ultimately, technology cannot be thesole answer and humans need to adapt their behavior as well, according to scientists and most government leaders. A such it seems as if the tech-fix illusion is nearing its end.

Technoscientific culture will prevail

Yet, there is another possibility. Taiwan and Singapore are continually cited as examples of countries where strong trust in technology has in fact paid off. China too, in addition to strict non-technological measures, has relied strongly on technological means to fight the pandemic, and successfully so. Even though these countries have different models of governance and other cosmotechnics than we do in the West, they could still show us how a different, arguably more determined, perspective on technology could help to prevent new crises in the future.

Indeed, there is no reason to be shy about our technological prowess. The record-breaking development of multiple vaccines may indeed provide us with the necessary level of confidence. In the coming months, the (prosperous part of the) world will be vaccinated and we will be able to continue our old lives. Thus, the development of the vaccines will probably go down in history as the absolute turning point of the crisis and modern technoscience will profit from this success for years to come. Criticism of technology will become less vehement and technoscientific culture will prevail (again).

In the same vein, Big Tech, despite the growing resistance against their power and behavior, and our digital infrastructure, kept the economy up and running during the lockdown. This stay-at-home economy will prove to have lasting, partly positive, consequences in our daily lives in the coming years.

A new technological order

All in all, we possess all the technological ingredients to make work of a new technological order that is geared towards preventing new crises in the future. Indeed, governments have been seriously contemplating how to deal with the vulnerabilities of the international traffic of humans and goods and fragmented value chains. The current market system is too efficiently and cost-effectively organized, which makes us vulnerable to shocks such as this. Resilience, reshoring and redundancy are the political and economic key words of the year. In short: we’re in the early stages of a truly thriving enlightened technocracy, aimed for the common and long-term good. As such, the corona crisis may end up putting us on the right track with respect to our perspective on technology. With the right technological changes and political determination, which have now been set in motion, crises will be more easily prevented in the future.

Hegemonic cycle 

The past year raises questions about the fate of globalization. The president of the United Sates blamed China for the global COVID-19 pandemic, after attempting to sabotage economic relations between the two countries in several different ways. Meanwhile, internal relations in Europe remained high-strung, with Poland and Hungary turning against the European course increasingly often. How should these developments be understood in a wider context? Is globalization as we’ve known it in the past decades coming to an end, as the stagnating growth of world trade seems to indicate? Will we have stronger borders between countries or are we merely on the brink of a phase of globalization in a new form?

The strategic reorientation of the West

The era of Atlantic hegemony, the hegemonic cycle of the past five centuries, is nearing its end. But it’s too early to determine whether a new hegemon will rise, or, with the end of this cycle, a new order will come into existence in which no country is dominant. Before we can answer that question, the current power relations will continue to change, causing the world to move towards a new order in several domains (e.g. finance, technical standards, strategic technology).

In the Western world, 2020 was a moment of strategic reorientation. The United States is renouncing the Trump model of exerting strategic pressure on rivals and partners alike. The Biden administration will attempt to breathe new life into American alliances, though this will be arduous in many places because of conflicting interests. In addition, Europe broke free from its geopolitical paralysis. In the past year, the European Commission and EU member states created more momentum for the ideas of strategic autonomy and European sovereignty, though it’s as yet unclear how this will take shape. Both Western superpowers are thus facing a moment of strategic reorientation. Furthermore, we’re in the midst of a period of “Westlessness”, lacking a clear idea of the West.

Thus the economic center is shifting east, and so the complexity of globalization will only become clear when we truly understand what is currently happening in, among other countries, China and Russia.

A different path of globalization

In the West, China is often perceived as a “challenger” of the world order, but in many areas, China is as supportive of international norms, rules and treaties as Western countries are, if not more so. Meanwhile, in the past year we saw investments in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative project decline. Not because China is weakening, or other countries are less willing to cooperate with China, but precisely because China is becoming a mature global power. The country now more strategically and responsibly considers foreign investment, as the U.S., Europe and Japan have done for decades. During the coronavirus crisis too, the stability of the Chinese global power has become apparent. In fact, the rapid recovery of the Chinese economy soon turned out to be a vital driving force of the global economy. In addition, in 2020 China was the largest economy to sign the RCEP trade deal of 15 countries, the biggest trade deal in the world. While the Western world is skeptical about accelerated integration with the global economy, Eastern countries actually embrace further economic globalization.

In 2020, Russia stayed in the background, but it’s precisely this that shows Russia is notably changing its course. It’s becoming a geo-economic power that leans less on military capacity than we think and is creating more influence with strategic economic policy. The Eurasian Economic Union is an important Russian initiative to strengthen economic ties with Eastern countries, so that Russia gains a stronger position than the West in respect to Europe. Russia’s biggest ambition is to create “technology transfer” – to import high-grade technology from Europe, Japan and South Korea to revive its own economy. With its new, remarkable course, Russia is laying the groundwork for this strategic move.

Thus, the complexity of globalization will become apparent in the coming years. The first responses to the coronavirus crisis, containing phrases such as “reshoring” and “the end of globalization”, seem to have been based on false hope. There has not been a fundamental reappraisal of efficiency in value chains either. Globalization will continue, but in a different way. There will be different types of globalization, as there are different elements to the world order. Many non-Western countries still embrace economic globalization, while Western countries, under the influence of certain political groups, are becoming more skeptical. Because of these dynamics, political globalization, in the form of multilateralism and the protection of human rights, is becoming more difficult rising countries such as China are less active in this area. Furthermore, new domains of globalization are emerging, such as the digital domain, where countries will be in direct opposition to each other with different digital models, projects and strategies, such as the Chinese New IP internet protocols, the Russian Runetand the European internet and data strategy and the GAIA-X platform. All of these projects gained momentum in 2020 and will take shape in the coming years.

Hence, in 2020, two major implications of the new complexity of globalization became clear.

First, there are stronger borders between the superpowers. The alliance between the U.S. and Europe is no longer a given. The stakes are getting higher because of the rise of other Eurasian countries and the cooperation between Western superpowers will become more opportunistic. The conflict between the U.S. and China will outlast Trump. 2020 also saw India and China butt heads with military clashes in the border region and mutual economic sanctions. The borders between superpowers are becoming harder in these times of hegemonic shift. Second, an opportunity is arising for a new model of globalization, in which Europe could play an important role. Efficient value chains will remain the driving force of economic growth and most developing countries will stay amenable to the model of economic globalization.

Precisely in this world, where the conflict between the U.S. and China is threatening the current model of globalization, an opportunity is arising for Europe to break new ground. With regulation, digital models and multilateral strategy, Europe may come to lead the world increasingly often in its own way, a way that would allow for a new phase of globalization.

Socio-cultural cycle 

Prior to this crisis, several contrasts in societies were becoming starker: between left and right, young and old, progressive and conservative, city and countryside, rich and poor, center and periphery, culture and nature. Individualization of citizens and countries is often identified as the cause of this development, but during the coronavirus crisis, collectivist initiatives among countries and citizens have also come into existence. Will this collectivist development persist or will the coronavirus crisis in fact accelerate individualization in the end, if cooperation proves too arduous?

Time to decide

In order to answer this question, we must first better understand the term “coronavirus crisis”. The word “crisis” is etymologically derived from the Greek krinein, which means to distinguish or decide. This makes a period of crisis a moment of truth: a decisive moment when we’re obliged to make judgments on what’s really important and what isn’t, what’s right and what’s wrong. A crisis always forces us to make a political and ethical choice to transform the current situation into a better and brighter future. At the same time, the coronavirus crisis is not a clear-cut phenomenon as it pertains to themes such as ecological degradation, our ideas on sickness and health and the fact that Wuhan changed from a small village to a city of millions in the course of a few decades and China has become integrated in international economic, political and tourist flows. In other words, the coronavirus crisis is a highly complex phenomenon, with different “aspects of crisis” that require us to make political and ethical choices for the future. If we follow this dialectic now, what will arise in the sociocultural domain?

First, the issues we’re faced with now are not easy-to-solve “puzzles” but wicked problems. The question how long bars should stay closed so that enough hospital beds will be available for covid patients, suggests a conflict between healthcare and the economy, but ultimately makes us realize how deeply healthcare and the economy are intertwined. Another wicked problem is the question how many civil liberties we’re prepared to sacrifice to restore our society to health.
Because of the uncertainty and complexity of the issues, it’s no wonder that countries with a capable institutional structure have done relatively well in this crisis. The same structural problems that are at the root of the pandemic will cause more of these complex issues in the future. The first example that comes to mind is of course the climate crisis, of which the coronavirus crisis has just been a small preview. Similar to the coronavirus pandemic, it’s not easy to tell whether the climate crisis is a fully man-made or natural phenomenon, and solutions to it require a new understanding of humankind and our relationship to nature. Another issue is the rise of “uncontrollable technology”, including synthetic biology and AI, the outcomes of which aren’t fully predictable by humans, and which will eventually fundamentally change our ideas of life and being human. In the same way that the coronavirus – the smallest lifeform to shut down human superorganisms such as our healthcare and education system – has forced us to reconsider our relationship to our fellow humans and society.

The coronavirus crisis has made many of us aware of the fact that, as humans, we’re embedded in wider social, technological and ecological structures, and that we depend on other people and countries. And yet, it’s unclear whether this insight will inspire a more collectivist attitude in citizens and bring countries closer together, as the failure of joint efforts could in fact lead to further individualization. For example, economic inequality translates to medical inequality and the debate on ethnic inequality and racism has reached boiling point during this crisis. Both themes are high on the agendas of policy-makers; during the U.S. presidential elections, for example, or in discussions on the future of the financial system. In addition, younger and older generations are affected differently by the economic and health crisis, and as such, respond to and reflect on it differently as well. There is also no consensus as yet about the future of work after the coronavirus crisis. Neither is there an answer to the questions whether virtual practices are a desirable and viable substitute for physical and social interaction, and whether coronavirus-related mental problems (e.g. loneliness, anxiety) require more, or less technologization of our living worlds. In fact, even our collective faith in established institutes and structures of knowledge and truth is under severe pressure.

The “moods” of metamodernism 

In other words, in the past year, we saw a high degree of ambivalence around sociocultural issues and possible solutions, with which we are confronted by different aspects of the coronavirus crisis. But what does this mean for us, our society and the wider sociocultural developments following the coronavirus crisis? In any case, the coronavirus crisis shows us a specific palette of “moods”. These moods bring aspects of reality to light which, in ordinary times, would have remained obscured from theoretical, abstract thought. Specific moods thus lead to new ways of relating to the world, pertaining to globalization and sustainability (stress versus hope), political initiatives (insecurity versus confusion), spirituality (boredom versus fear).

These moods aren’t purely subjective, not “all in our heads”, but are in fact intersubjective: they arise when we relate to and interact with the world and other people around us. The fact that(almost) all of us act like a “superorganism” that is focused on a single phenomenon and acts accordingly (e.g. developing a vaccine, staying in quarantine) also makes the coronavirus crisis a metamodern concept. And with the adoption of the metamodern perspective, new sociocultural transitions are made possible. We no longer revert to modern objectivism and naiveté, but neither do we succumb to postmodern pessimism or irony. In other words, the metamodern coronavirus crisis could thus form the idealistic foundation for the new metarules of new societal, economic and political systems.

So from the subjective mind (moods), we are now arriving at the objective mind and reality (metamodernism) of the corona crisis. We’ve known for over a hundred years that God is dead, but we’re still living with the nihilistic base mood in which there are no grand narratives anymore. The coronavirus crisis confronts us with a harsh reality from which we can no longer escape: that we are mortal, finite beings, that sickness and death are a part of life. Like Trumpism, which should also be understood as a complex and metamodern phenomenon, the coronavirus crisis has created an enormous “memeplex”. This is a new, metamodern way of dealing with such phenomena. Memes and other forms of culture help us to find meaning, ethics, politics, a relationship between the community and the individual. There’s a reason the coronavirus crisis is seized upon by artists and scientists, politicians and conspiracy theorists alike to reflect further on this theme and incorporate it in art, culture and a new structure of feeling.